The informativeness principle demonstrates qualitative benefits to increasing signal precision. However, it is difficult to quantify these benefits -and compare them against the costs of monitoring technology -since we typically cannot solve for the optimal contract and analyze how it changes with precision. We consider a standard agency model with risk-neutrality and limited liability (as in Innes (1990)), where the optimal contract is a call option. The direct effect of reducing signal volatility is a fall in the value of the option and thus the agent's expected wage, benefiting the principal. The indirect effect is a change in the agent's effort incentives. If the original option is deeply out-of-the-money, the agent can only beat the strike price if he exerts effort and there is a high noise realization. Thus, a fall in volatility weakens effort incentives. As the agency problem becomes weaker, the gains from increased precision fall towards zero. These results potentially justify pay-for-luck and the absence of relative performance evaluation.
A major result in contract theory is the informativeness principle (Holmstrom (1979) , Shavell (1979) , Gjesdal (1982) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , Kim (1995) ). 1 It argues that the principal should maximize the precision of the performance measure used to evaluate the agent. Greater precision allows the principal to use a cheaper contract to implement at least the same effort level. However, in practice, increasing informativeness is costly. Investing in a superior monitoring technology involves direct costs. Engaging in relative performance evaluation ("RPE") involves the indirect costs of forgoing the benefits of pay-for-luck documented by prior research (e.g. Oyer (2004) , Raith (2008) , Axelson and Baliga (2009) , and Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010)). Potentially for this reason, numerous violations of RPE have been found in practice. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Murphy (1999) show that CEO pay is determined by absolute, rather than relative performance. Jenter and Kanaan (2013) similarly find an absence of RPE in CEO firing decisions. Whether these violations are an efficient response to the indirect costs of RPE is unclear. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that CEOs are paid for positive exogenous shocks, particularly in firms with weak governance, consistent with the view that they are inefficient. Indeed, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that the absence of RPE is a key piece of evidence that CEO compensation is not determined by efficient contracting with shareholders, and instead results from rent extraction by CEOs. The informativeness principle argues that there are qualitative benefits to increasing signal precision. However, for a principal to decide whether to invest in greater precision, she must quantify these benefits -in particular, relate them to the underlying parameters of the contracting problem -so that she can compare them against the cost of precision. Similarly, to evaluate whether the general absence of RPE is efficient, it is useful to understand under which settings the benefits of informativeness are smallest, and compare them against the cases in which RPE is particularly absent in reality. Such quantification is difficult under the general framework in which the informativeness principle was derived. As is well-known (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1983) ), in a 1 Shavell (1979) shows that additional information on the agent's effort has positive value. Gjesdal (1982) and Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the information structure A is sufficient for the information structure B in the sense of Blackwell, then A is associated with a lower agency cost than B. Holmstrom (1979) shows that any signal which is informative about the agent's action will be included in the contract. Lastly, Kim (1995) shows that the information structure A is more efficient than B if the cumulative distribution function of the likelihood ratio under A is a mean-preserving spread of the one under B. general setting it is not possible to solve for the optimal contract. We cannot analyze precisely how the contract changes in response to increased informativeness, and thus quantify the cost savings from contract redesign. This paper addresses this open question. We consider the standard setting of risk neutrality and limited liability, which allows us to solve for the optimal contract. These restrictions lead to optimal contracts that we see in practice -as shown by Innes (1990) , the agent has a call option. A fall in the strike price increases the option's delta and thus the agent's effort incentives, but also augments the value of the option and thus his expected wage. Thus, the strike price is the minimum possible to satisfy the agent's incentive constraint.
We analyze the effect of increasing the informativeness of the signal on which the option is based, through a mean-preserving spread. We can decompose the gains from informativeness into two effects, each of which has a clear economic interpretation. First, ignoring the incentive constraint, a fall in volatility directly reduces the value of the option and thus the agent's expected wage. Second, the increase in precision changes the agent's incentives. The heart of the paper analyzes this incentive effect and shows how its direction depends on the model's underlying parameters.
The agent's effort incentives stem from the difference in value between two options -the (less valuable) option that he receives when he shirks ("option-when-shirking"), and the (more valuable) option that he receives when he works and improves the signal distribution ("option-when-working"). Changes in signal precision affect the values of these options differentially. We start by considering general distributions for the signal. If the call option satisfies increasing differences, i.e. effort and precision are complements (an increase in precision augments the sensitivity of the option's value to effort), then a rise in informativeness augments effort incentives. The principal can thus increase the strike price of the option, i.e. reduce its delta, without violating the agent's incentive constraint. This strike price increase further reduces the expected wage, and reinforces the first, direct effect. In contrast, if effort and precision are substitutes, an increase in informativeness weakens effort incentives, offsetting the first effect. In the limit, it fully offsets it, rendering the total benefit of precision zero.
We then focus the model on symmetric signal distributions with unbounded support and a location and scale parameter, such as the Normal and logistic distributions. The existence of a scale parameter -the volatility of the distribution -allows us to fully characterize changes in precision by changes in this volatility parameter. In turn, we can use the concept of the option's vega (sensitivity to volatility) to analyze how changes in precision affect the value of the "option-when-shirking" compared to the "option-when-working", and thus the agent's incentives. The existence of a location parameter allows us to quantify the vega of each option by comparing this location parameter to the option's strike price; the strike price in turn depends on the model's underlying inputs (e.g. the severity of the agency problem). We can thus be precise on the conditions under which effort and informativeness are complements or substitutes.
First, consider the case in which the cost of effort is high, i.e. the moral hazard problem is severe. The option will initially have a low strike price, so that its delta is sufficiently large to induce working. Since the strike price is low, the option-whenworking will be deeply in-the-money, and the option-when-shirking is closer to at-themoney. The vega of an option is highest when it is at-the-money. Thus, the vega of the option-when-shirking is greater, and an increase in informativeness reduces its value faster than the option-when-working. Overall, the fall in volatility increases the agent's incentives. Intuitively, when volatility is high, the agent's effort incentives are weak because, even if he shirked, he would still earn a high wage if he received a positive shock. The agent is not worried about the fact that, if he shirks and receives a negative shock, the signal will be very low, because his payoff can be no lower than zero due to limited liability.
We next consider a low cost of effort, which leads to the initial strike price being high. Then, the option-when-shirking will be deeply out-of-the-money, and the optionwhen-working will be closer to at-the-money. Thus, the vega of the latter option is greater, and its value falls with informativeness faster than the option-when-shirking, lowering incentives. Intuitively, when the strike price is high, the agent will only receive a positive wage if he exerts effort and receives a sufficiently positive shock. When volatility falls, such shocks are less likely, and so the agent may not get paid even if he does work. Thus, his effort incentives decline.
In sum, when incentives are strong (weak) to begin with, e.g. for CEOs (rankand-file workers), an increase in informativeness further increases (reduces) incentives, amplifying (lowering) the gains from informativeness. Note that this result continues to hold even if the cost of precision is proportional to the original cost of compensation. Thus, when the moral hazard problem is weak, leading to low compensation costs, then even though it is cheaper to increase informativeness, the principal still chooses not to do so.
In addition to studying whether a firm should endogenously choose to increase informativeness, our analysis also investigates the impact of exogenous changes in informativeness. An exogenous increase in volatility (see Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) and DeAngelis, Grullon, and Michenaud (2013) for natural experiments) will increase (reduce) the effort incentives of agents with out-of-the-money (in-the-money) options. Thus, if firms recontract in response to these exogenous shocks, firms with in-the-money options should increase their CEOs' incentives relative to firms with outof-the-money options, either by granting additional options, or reducing the strike price of new grants or existing options.
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In a similar vein, since an improvement in informativeness increases (reduces) the optimal strike price if the option was initially in-the-money (out-of-the-money), it causes the option to become closer to at-the-money. Thus, improvements in informativeness (e.g. increases in stock market efficiency) lead to at-the-money ("ATM") options being optimal. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that the almost universal practice of granting ATM options is suboptimal and that out-of-the-money options are more effective because the agent only gets paid if performance is very high. Such an argument ignores the incentive effect: out-of-the-money options have lower deltas and thus provide fewer incentives.
A recent paper by Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2013) also considers the incentive constraint when assessing the benefits of a specific form of increased informativeness -indexing stock and options -and similarly show that indexation may weaken incentives. They use a quite different setting from ours, which reflects the different aims of each paper. Their primary goal is to calibrate real-life contracts, and so their model incorporates risk aversion to allow them to input risk aversion parameters into the calibration. However, under risk aversion, it is very difficult to solve for the optimal contract. They therefore restrict the contract to comprising salary, stock, and options, and hold stock constant when changing the contract to restore the agent's incentives upon indexation. They acknowledge that the actual savings from indexation will be different if the principal uses an initially optimal contract and responds optimally to changes in incentives. In contrast, our primary goal is theoretical. We incorporate risk neutrality and limited liability, allowing us to take an optimal contracting approach. In addition, our model allows the analysis of reductions in volatility through other means than indexation, for example investing in a superior monitoring technology.
Other explanations for pay-for-luck have been proposed in the literature, partially reviewed by Edmans and Gabaix (2009) . Oyer (2004) shows that pay-for-luck may be optimal if the value of workers' outside options vary with economic conditions and if re-contracting is costly. Raith (2008) shows that it may be preferable to base compensation on measures of output rather than input when the agent has private information on the production technology. Axelson and Baliga (2009) argue that, for contracts to be renegotiation-proof, the manager must have private information that causes him to have a different view from the board on the value of his long-term pay. Industry performance is an example of such information, and so it may be efficient not to filter it out. Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) show that tying the CEO's pay to industry performance induces him to choose the firm's industry exposure correctly.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 shows that the optimal contract takes the form of a call option. Section 3 derives the gains from a reduction in the variance of the performance measure. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A contains all proofs not in the main text.
The Model
We consider a standard principal-agent model with risk neutrality and limited liability, similar to Innes (1990) . The timing is as follows. At time t = −1, the principal (firm) offers a compensation contract W to the agent (worker). At t = 0, the agent chooses his effort level e ∈ {0, e}. Effort of e = 0 is of zero cost to the agent, and e = e costs him C > 0. We will sometimes refer to e = e as "high effort" or "working", and e = 0 as "low effort" or "shirking".
At t = 1, the agent's contribution to firm value ("output") q is realized. As in the literature on performance measurement (e.g. Baker (1992)), output is generally not contractible, since it is difficult to measure an employee's contribution independently of his colleagues'. Instead, contracts can depend on a performance signal
where η is mean-zero noise that is uncorrelated with effort: E [η|e] = 0. For example, η may be a market or industry shock, the contribution of other workers, or measurement error. We assume that output q is not contractible and the contract depends on a separate signal s, so that we can change signal precision without affecting output volatility. However, the model allows for the case in which output is contractible, which corresponds to the degenerate distribution concentrated at η = 0.
Conditional on effort e, the signal s is continuously distributed according to the probability density function ("PDF") f θ (s|e) with full support on [s,s] , where the bounds s ands may or may not be finite. Let F θ (s|e) denote the cumulative distribution function ("CDF") of s. A high signal is "good news" about effort in the sense of the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
Strict MLRP implies that the distribution of performance is ordered according to strict first-order stochastic dominance ("FOSD"): F θ (s|0) > F θ (s|e) for all s and all θ. The real-valued parameter θ ∈ Θ captures the informativeness or precision of the signal, and orders the distributions in terms of second-order stochastic dominance. Formally, the mean of the signal is independent of θ, and
for all t ∈ [s, s], where the bounds may or may not be finite. Thus, increases in θ generate more precise signal distributions in the sense of mean-preserving spreads. The cost to the principal of choosing precision θ is κ (θ), where κ is increasing and convex. Under the interpretation that η arises from measurement error, removing the shock corresponds to an improvement in the monitoring technology, in which case κ (θ) refers to the cost of such an improvement. For example, Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist (2013) show that boards of directors engage in extensive (and thus costly) monitoring to gather soft information on the CEO's competence, strategic choice, and effort. Under the interpretation that η is a market or industry shock, increasing precision θ corresponds to relative performance evaluation (RPE), in which case the cost κ (θ) stems from two sources. First, it can arise from the literal cost of implementing RPE. While the actual calculation of industry performance, given a peer group, is relatively costless, the determination of the peer group may involve the hiring of compensation consultants. Second, the cost can also represent the loss of the benefits of pay-for-luck highlighted by prior work, e.g. Oyer (2004) , Raith (2008) , Axelson and Baliga (2009) , and Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010).
The discount rate is normalized to zero. Given a contract W (·) and a level of effort e, the agent's expected wage is
The agent is risk-neutral and so maximizes his expected wage, less the cost of effort. He is protected by limited liability and has a reservation utility of zero. The principal is also risk-neutral and chooses a contract W (·) that maximizes expected output E [q], less the expected wage E [W ] and cost of precision κ (θ).
Following Innes (1990) , we make two assumptions on the set of feasible contracts. First, the agent is protected by limited liability, so that W (s) ≥ 0 for all s. Second, the pay-performance sensitivity lies between 0 and 1:
for all s, . Innes (1990) justifies these contraints on two grounds for the case in which the signal equals output (which is nested by our model). If the constraint on the left did not hold, the agent could borrow on his own account to artificially increase output, thus undoing the contract. If the constraint on the right did not hold, the principal would exercise her control rights to "burn" output, thereby increasing her payoff. These constraints can be expressed as
for all . It thus follows that W (·) is Lipschitz continuous and, therefore, differentiable almost everywhere. Hence, with no loss of generality, we can assume that the contract W (·) is a cadlag function satisfying 0 ≤ W (s) ≤ 1 at all points of differentiability.
given by:
To satisfy (2), the principal pays an expected wage E [W (s) |e] that equals the agent's cost of effort C. Thus, if
high effort is optimal for the principal. We assume (3) throughout, else even under the first-best, the principal would not want to induce effort. In the second best, the agent's effort is unverifiable and so the contract must satisfy an incentive constraint. The agent will exert effort if and only if:
Following standard arguments, this incentive constraint will bind. In contrast, the participation constraint will be slack if the principal wishes to implement high effort. 4 We thus ignore it in the analysis that follows. We define X θ implicitly by
We will show in Lemma 1 that X θ exists and is unique. The intuition behind (5) is that, if the agent is given a call option on s, X θ is the strike price such that working increases the value of the agent's option by an amount equal to the cost of effort, so that the incentive constraint is satisfied with equality. We make the following assumption to ensure that e = e is second-best optimal:
The first term,
, is the benefit to the principal of inducing e = e. The second term is the cost of the contract required to do so. If (6) did not hold, the principal would allow the agent to shirk, in which case the problem would be trivial and the contract would involve a constant wage. Note that (6) implies
which is stronger than (3), the condition that guarantees that high effort is optimal in the first-best. The additional term
ds arises because the agent will earn rents from shirking (as he may enjoy a very positive shock and generate a high signal); thus, he must be offered rents to working to satisfy his incentive constraint.
The principal's problem is to choose a contract W (·) and informativeness θ to minimize the sum of the expected wage and the cost of precision, subject to the agent's incentive and limited liability constraints, plus the constraints on the slope of the contract. She chooses a cadlag function W (·) and an informativeness parameter θ to minimize
subject to
0 ≤ W (s) ≤ 1 at all points of differentiability of W.
Our setup is similar to Innes (1990) . He considers a financing model where the agent (entrepreneur) chooses a financing contract to maximize his objective function, subject to the incentive constraint of the agent and the participation constraint of the principal (investor). We consider a contracting model where the principal (firm) chooses an employment contract to maximize her objective function subject to the incentive and participation constraints of the agent (worker). As per footnote 2 of Innes (1990), these two optimization problems yield the same optimal contracts. Since Innes studies a financing setting, the optimal contract for the principal is debt. Thus, the agent has equity, which is a call option on the firm's assets; here, we will show that the agent receives a call option on the signal. Another difference is that Innes features a continuous action set. His focus was to derive the form of the optimal contract and thus he wishes to do so in the most general setting. Our goal is different: given that the optimal contract is a call option, we study how changes in informativeness affect the agent's incentives and thus the strike price. 5 We thus specialize to a binary effort level. With a continuous effort level, a change in informativeness θ may alter the optimal effort level. It is well known that solving for the optimal effort level in addition to the cheapest contract that induces a given effort level is extremely complex (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1983)), and thus many papers focus on the implementation of a given effort level (e.g. Dittmann and Maug (2007), Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010, 2013)). 6 Edmans and Gabaix (2011) show that, if the benefits of effort are multiplicative in firm size and the firm is sufficiently large, it is always optimal for the principal to implement the highest effort level and so the optimal effort level is indeed fixed. We thus consider a binary effort setting where high effort is optimal.
The Optimal Contract
We solve the problem in two stages. The first stage, analyzed in this section, solves for the optimal contract for a fixed level of informativeness θ. The analysis is similar to Innes (1990) . Our main results will come in Section 3, which analyzes the second stage: the optimal level of informativeness. Our approach, therefore, follows the general idea of Grossman and Hart (1983) in that we split the moral hazard problem into two stages. However, unlike in Grossman and Hart, our second stage yields the optimal level of informativeness rather than the optimal level of effort. Lemma 1 determines the optimal contract W θ (·) taking the informativeness level θ as fixed:
Lemma 1 (Optimal contract) For a given θ, there exists a unique optimal contract, characterized by e = e, and
where X θ is determined by the unique solution of (5).
The contract (11) is the payoff of a call option on s with strike price X θ . There is a unique X θ which satisfies the incentive constraint with equality (5).
While informativeness θ affects the strike price X θ , the optimal contract is a call option for any given θ. The setting is slightly different from Innes (1990) , since the principal is contracting on a signal rather than output. We show that the Innes (1990) result of the optimality of a call option extends to this case, and the intuition is the same. The absolute value of the likelihood ratio is highest in the tails of the distribution of s, so the signal is most informative about effort in the tails. The left tail cannot be used for incentive purposes due to the limited liability constraint, and so incentives are concentrated in the right tail. This maximizes the likelihood that positive payments are received by a working agent. With an upper-bound on the slope, the optimal contract involves call options on s with the maximum feasible slope, i.e. W (s) = 1.
Lemma 2 below shows that the strike price falls with the cost of effort.
Lemma 2 Let X θ be the strike price in the optimal contract for a given θ. Then, X θ is decreasing in the cost of effort C, i.e.
Proof. The Appendix shows that the incentive constraint (5) can be rewritten:
Applying the implicit function theorem yields:
By strict FOSD, the denominator in equation (13) is positive -effort improves the distribution of the signal. The higher the cost of effort C, the higher the agent's reward must be for improving the distribution of the signal, to encourage him to induce effort. Lowering the strike price raises the delta of the option (the sensitivity of the option to the value of s) and thus the agent's incentives.
The Value of Informativeness

General Distributions
The total effect of increasing informativeness on the expected wage can be decomposed as follows:
The first component is the direct effect,
Holding constant the strike price, an increase in signal precision changes the value of the option; we will later prove that this effect is negative. This is the standard benefit of informativeness traditionally focused on by advocates of RPE (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) ). In the Holmstrom (1979) setting of a risk-averse agent, an increase in informativeness reduces the risk borne by the agent and thus allows the principal to lower the expected wage without violating the agent's participation constraint. In our setting of risk neutrality and limited liability, an increase in precision (weakly) reduces the value of the option.
The second component is the incentive effect,
, which arises because the increase in precision causes the strike price to rise by dX θ dθ to maintain incentive compatibility.
is negative -any increase in the strike price reduces the value of the option and thus the cost of compensation -but the sign of dX θ dθ is unclear. We thus seek to derive conditions under which an increase in precision raises or lowers the optimal strike price. The following definition will be useful:
It satisfies decreasing differences if −g satisfies increasing differences. θ and e are complements if g (θ, e) satisfies increasing differences, substitutes if g (θ, e) satisfies decreasing differences, and neutral if g (θ, e) satisfies both increasing and decreasing differences.
The increasing differences condition (15) means that the incremental gain (i.e., increase in the value of the function g) from effort, g (θ, e H ) − g (θ, e L ), is increasing in θ.
That is, effort and informativeness are complements in terms of their effect on g. Conversely, decreasing differences means that the incremental gain from effort is decreasing in θ. Thus, effort and informativeness are substitutes. Indeed, increasing differences is the most common definition of complementarity, whereas decreasing differences is the most common definition of substitutability. 7 In our setting, increasing differences is equivalent to the single-crossing condition:
We will apply Definition 1 to our particular setting of e = {0,ē}.
We are concerned with how changes in precision affect the incentive constraint (4). The agent's incentives stem from the fact that exerting effort increases the value of his option. If he works, his option is work E [W (s) |e]; we refer to this as an "optionwhen-working." If he shirks, he receives an "option-when-shirking" worth E [W (s) |0]. His effort incentives are given by the difference in the values of these options, i.e.
Since a change in precision θ will affect E [W (s) |e] and E [W (s) |0] to different degrees, they will affect the agent's effort incentives (16) . When precision and effort are complements, i.e. E [W (s)|e] satisfies increasing differences, then we have
and increases in precision augment the agent's effort incentives. We thus wish to understand the conditions under which E [W (s)|e] satisfies increasing differences. We do so by using integration by parts (see Appendix A) to rewrite the agent's expected wage as
The third term, X θ s F θ (s|e) ds, the area under the CDF between s and X θ . It can be interpreted economically as the value of a put option with a strike price of X:
where the last equality follows from integration by parts. Under this interpretation, equation (18) is the put-call parity equation. The agent's call option equals the expected value of the signal, minus the strike price, plus the value of a put option.
To study whether E [W (s)|e] satisfies increasing differences, we examine each of the three terms on the right-hand side ("RHS") of (18) in turn. While E [s|e] depends on e, it is independent of θ since changes in θ represent mean-preserving spreads. In addition, X θ depends on θ but not e. Thus, θ and e are neutral in their effect on both of these terms, and non-neutral only in their effect on the third term
This observation leads to the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 The agent's expected pay E [W (s)|e] satisfies increasing differences if and only if the area under the CDF,
The usefulness of Lemma 3 lies in the fact that, while the value of the call option contains several terms (see (18) ), the area under the CDF X θ s F θ (s|e) ds is a single term, and so it is relatively easy to verify whether it satisfies increasing differences. While it may seem intuitive that the value of the call option satisfies increasing differences if and only if the value of the put option satisfies increasing differences, the value of Lemma 3 is that we can check whether expected pay satisfies increasing differences by studying a single term X θ s F θ (s|e) ds -not that this term can be interpreted as the value of a put option. We thus apply the definition of substitutes and complements in Definition 1 to the area under the CDF, X θ s F θ (s|e) ds. Proposition 1 determines the effect of informativeness on the strike price X θ .
Proposition 1
The optimal strike price X θ is increasing in informativeness θ ( dX θ dθ > 0) if informativeness and effort are complements at the strike price X θ , decreasing in informativeness ( dX θ dθ < 0) if they are substitutes at X θ , and constant ( dX θ dθ = 0) if they are neutral at X θ .
When precision and effort are complements, exerting effort augments the value of the call option by a greater amount when precision is high. As a result, the agent's marginal benefit from effort, E [W (s)|e] − E [W (s)|0], is increasing in informativeness. This loosens the incentive constraint, and allows the principal to increase the strike price (thus reducing the expected wage) while still inducing effort. Thus, in addition to the direct benefit of informativeness (it reduces the expected wage, holding constant the strike price X θ ), the principal further benefits from the incentive effect of greater informativeness. Proposition 1 in turn leads to Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 4 (Partial and total effects of informativeness on expected wage):
Proof. From equation (14), we have: ≤ 0) and thus the expected wage. Turning to the incentive effect, higher precision augments the strike price by dX θ dθ , which in turn requires the principal to pay an additional dX θ dθ dollars whenever the price exceeds X θ , which occurs with probability 1 − F θ (X θ |e).
The sign of dX θ dθ in turn depends on whether informativeness and effort are substitutes or complements. When they are complements, then dX θ dθ > 0. The strike price increases, further reducing the expected wage and reinforcing the direct effect. When they are substitutes, then dX θ dθ < 0 and the effects go in opposite directions. While the value of the option decreases with precision, the agent requires a lower strike price to induce effort, which partially offsets the benefits to the principal.
Even when dX θ dθ < 0 and the incentive effect works in the opposite direction to the direct effect, it can never outweigh it. The total effect d dθ E [W (s)|e] is always weakly negative, i.e. increasing precision weakly reduces the expected wage. This result arises from revealed preference. If reducing precision reduced the expected wage, the principal would have added in randomness to the contract, and so the initial contract would not have been optimal. Even though the incentive effect cannot outweigh the direct effect, it is still important to consider as it affects the optimal level of precision θ that the principal should choose, since precision is costly.
Specific Distributions
The results of Section 3.1 show that, with general distributions, the effect of precision on incentives depends on whether effort and precision are complements or substitutes. We now add more structure on the signal distribution to provide specific conditions under which we have complements or substitutes, and thus changes in precision increase or decrease the agent's incentives. In particular, we will be able to relate the gains from increased informativeness to the underlying parameters of the agency problem.
We consider the case in which the signal s has a symmetric distribution with unbounded support and location and scale parameters, i.e., their distribution and density functions can respectively be written as F σ (s|e) = G , where θ is the same informativeness / precision parameter we had earlier.
The effect of precision on incentives depends on how changes in precision affect the value of the option-when-working compared to the option-when-shirking. The introduction of a scale parameter σ is useful because we can fully parameterize changes in precision by changes in σ. We can thus examine how changes in volatility affect the values of these two options -and thus the agent's effort incentives -using the familiar concept of the option "vega": the sensitivity of its value to volatility. Specifically, comparing the vegas of the two options will allow us to assess the effect on the agent's overall incentives. The introduction of a location parameter is useful as it allows us to relate the vega of each option to the distance between the option's initial strike price and the location parameter. The initial strike price in turn depends on the underlying parameters of the agency problem. Thus, we will be able to relate the incentive effect to the underlying parameters of the setting. The assumptions of symmetry and unbounded support are useful for tractability. Appendix B extends the results to asymmetric distributions and to distributions with a bounded support (such as the uniform distribution).
With a location and a scale parameter, the signal can now be written as:
where ε has a mean of 0 and volatility of 1, and σ parameterizes the volatility of the signal. Since the location of the distribution can be altered without changing its scale, we can set E [q] = e without loss of generality. All of the results in Section 3.1 continue to hold, except we will now denote the strike price by X σ rather than X θ . Proposition 2 below derives a precise condition under which Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 hold, i.e. the put option satisfies increasing differences, and so the optimal strike price is increasing in informativeness. 
. This in turn holds if and only if
Proposition 2 states that the incentive effect is positive, i.e. an increase in precision augments incentives and thus the strike price, if and only if X σ is below a threshold X ≡ e 2 .
To understand the intuition, equation (17) now becomes
Since precision can be parameterized by volatility, we are interested in how changes in volatility increase the agent's incentives to exert effort -i.e. whether effort and volatility are complements or substitutes -and how this depends on the initial strike price of the option. To highlight the dependence of the option values on the strike price, let Y (e, X) denote (the value of) an option where the mean value of the underlying variable is e and the strike price is X. We thus have
The left-hand side ("LHS") of inequality (22) represents the effect of changes in σ on incentives. This is equal to the vega of the option worth Y (e, X) minus the vega of the option worth Y (0, X). The vega of an option is always positive, highest for an ATM option (see Claim 1 in the Appendix), and declines when the option moves either in-the-money or out-of-the-money. Thus, the vega of the option worth Y (e, X) is highest at X = e, and so if the option has a strike price of X = e 2 , then it is inthe-money by , are unchanged, and so the strike price X does not need to change. We thus have dXσ dσ = 0 for X = X. Now consider X < X. Then, Y (0, X) is closer to being ATM than Y (e, X), and so it has a higher vega. The intuition is as follows. Volatility increases the value of an option because the option holder benefits from its asymmetric payoff: his downside risk is limited, but he benefits from the upside gain. Since the strike price is low, if the agent works (and receives an option worth Y (e, X)), the expected signal e is very far from the kink X, and thus the agent benefits little from the asymmetry. Thus, when volatility increases, a working agent gains from any upside but also loses from any downside, and so Y (e, X) rises little with σ. In contrast, if the agent shirks (and receives Y (0, X)), the expected signal 0 is close to the kink X. Thus, when volatility increases, a shirking agent gains from any upside but does not lose from any downside. Thus, Y (0, X) rises significantly with σ. In sum, an increase in σ reduces the agent's effort incentives, and so a fall in X σ is needed to restore incentive compatibility, since it increase the value of Y (e, X) more than Y (0, X). In simple language, when volatility rises and X < X, the agent thinks: "I'm not going to bother working hard, because even if I do, I might be unlucky and so profits will be low. I might as well shirk, because even if I get unlucky and profits become very low, that doesn't matter, because I can't get paid less than zero no matter how low profits get."
Finally, consider X > X. Then, since Y (e, X) is closer to being ATM than Y (0, X), it has a higher vega (the intuition is analogous to the case of X < X). Since Y (e, X) is close to the kink, when volatility increases, an agent who works benefits from the upside potential and is protected from the downside risk. Thus, Y (e, X) rises significantly with σ. In contrast, if the agent shirks (and receives Y (0, X)), the expected signal 0 is well below the kink. Thus, when volatility increases, the agent does not bear the downside risk, but is unlikely to benefit from the upside potential either: even if noise is positive, the option will still be out-of-the-money. Thus, Y (0, X) rises little with σ. In sum, an increase in σ augments the agent's effort incentives, and so a rise in X σ is possible without violating the incentive constraint. In simple language, when volatility rises and X > X, the agent thinks: "If volatility were low, I wouldn't bother working because the target X is so high that I wouldn't meet it, even if I did work. But, now that volatility is high, I will work -because if I do, and I get lucky, I'll meet the target."
In the language of the general model of Section 3.1, when C is small (the agency problem is weak), then X > X and so we have decreasing differences. Since informativeness and incentives are substitutes, an increase in informativeness reduces incentives and so requires the strike price to fall in response. When C is large (the agency probloem is strong), then X < X and so we have increasing differences. An increase in informativeness can be accompanied by an increase in the strike price.
Proposition 2 implies that, in all cases, improvements in informativeness draw the strike price X towards X, i.e. bring options closer to ATM. Thus, improvements in informativeness (e.g. increases in stock market efficiency) lead to ATM options being optimal, in contrast to Bebchuk and Fried's (2004) concern that the almost universal practice of granting ATM options is inefficient. They argue that out-of-the-money options would be cheaper for the firm, but this view ignores the incentive effect: outof-the-money options have lower deltas and thus may provide the agent with insufficient incentives. Murphy (2002) notes that in-the-money options would provide strongest incentives, but that the tax code discourages such options. One interpretation is that the tax code leads to firms choosing ATM options when in-the-money options may be more efficient. Our analysis indeed suggests that increases in informativeness lead to options optimally being close to ATM.
In addition, Proposition 2 suggests that exogenous falls in σ will have different effects on the incentives of agents depending on the moneyness of their options. In particular, it will reduce (increase) the incentives of agents with out-of-the-money (inthe-money) options. Thus, firms may wish to reduce the strike prices of out-of-themoney options to restore incentives. Option repricing is documented empirically by Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000), although they do not study if it is prompted by falls in volatility. Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000) also study the repricing of options theoretically, although in responses to changes in the mean rather than volatility of the signal. Corollary 1 derives the limiting case, as the cost of effort goes to zero, for the case of the Normal distribution:
Corollary 1 (Normal distribution). We have the following limiting cases:
As the cost of effort goes to zero, i.e. the moral hazard problem becomes weaker, then the total effect of informativeness becomes miniscule relative to the direct effect. Thus, ignoring the incentive effect and considering only the direct effect would substantially overestimate the gains from informativeness.
Finally, note that the above analysis takes an optimal contracting approach, so the slope of the contract is the maximum possible without violating the constraint (10). We thus have W (s) = 1: the agent is the residual "claimant" of any increase in the signal (as long as s ≥ X θ ). Thus, the principal changes X θ to ensure that the incentive constraint binds. An alternative approach is to restrict the contract to comprising ATM options, e.g. for accounting or tax reasons, and instead meet the incentive constraint by varying the slope of the contract. Indeed, Murphy (1999) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) document that ATM options are almost universally granted. Appendix C demonstrates an analogous result for this case. With ATM options, we have X > X and so effort and precision are substitutes. An increase in informativeness requires the number of options granted to increase, to maintain incentive compatibility. An increase in the number of options granted augments the expected wage, just like a decrease in the strike price. As a result, the total effect of informativeness on expected pay is less than the direct effect. Thus, the results of the core model, where X > X, extend to the case of ATM options.
Normal Distribution -Graphical Illustrations
We now demonstrate graphically the importance of considering the incentive constraint when evaluating the effect of informativeness on incentives, i.e. studying the total rather than direct effect. We need to assume a specific distribution to enable us to calculate these derivatives, and so we consider the case of the Normal distribution. Let ϕ and Φ denote the PDF and CDF of the standard Normal distribution, respectively. Then, the total effect 
These expressions are derived in the Appendix. In Figure 1 , we illustrate these effects numerically for a range of values of X. Note that the exogenous parameter that is changing is C, but since X is strictly decreasing in C (equation (13)), there is a one-toone correspondence between C and X. Thus, we draw the graph with X rather than C on the x-axis, as is standard for graphs of option values. To understand Figure 1 , recall from (14) that the total effect is given by
, tends to zero as the strike price approaches either −∞ or ∞. The vega of an option is greatest when the option is ATM, i.e. X = 1. An ATM option benefits most from the asymmetry in an option's payoff: a high noise realization leads to a large increase in the option's payoff, but a low noise realization has no effect as the agent will not exercise the option.
The incentive effect,
, captures the effect of volatility on the expected wage through affecting the agent's incentives. The incentive effect comprises of two components. The first is the change in strike price to maintain incentive compatibility,
is positive if and only if X > X. The second is the change in the value of the option when the strike price increases,
. This change is always negative, and its magnitude is increasing in the moneyness of the option. As X decreases below X, the incentive benefits of greater informativeness strengthen ( dX θ dσ becomes more negative). In addition, since the option becomes increasingly in the money,
∂E[W (s)|e]
∂X θ becomes even more negative and falls towards −1. Thus, the overall incentive effect
becomes monotonically more positive as X falls. However, as X rises above X, the two components of the incentive effect move in opposite directions. On the one hand, greater informativeness becomes increasingly detrimental to incentives ( dX θ dσ becomes more positive). On the other hand,
falls towards zero: when the option is deeply out-of-the-money, its value is small and thus little affected by changes in the strike price. Overall, the impact of X on the incentive effect is non-monotonic. As X initially rises above X, the incentive effect becomes increasingly negative as the option has significant value, and is affected by the change in the strike price required to maintain incentives (
∂X θ is large). However, as X continues to rise, the option's value falls and becomes little affected by the strike price (
∂X θ is small), so the incentive effect becomes less negative and approaches zero. The total effect
combines these direct and incentive effects. While the direct effect is initially increasing in X, this is outweighed by the fact that the incentive effect is initially decreasing in X. Overall, the total gains from increased informativeness are monotonically decreasing in X. In turn, C is the exogenous parameter that drives X. Lemma 5 below formally states that the gains from informativeness increase in the cost of effort.
Lemma 5 (Effect of cost of effort on gains from informativeness)
In both Figures, consistent with Lemma 4, considering only the direct effect leads to an underestimation (overestimation) of the total gains from informativeness for X < (>) X. The direct effect significantly overestimates the total gains for sufficiently large X. For example, for σ = 1 and X = 2 (which is only one standard deviation away from the expected performance of e = 1), the gains from a marginal change in σ are 2.4 times larger with the direct effect than with the total effect. Thus, even for non-extreme parameter values, gains from improved informativeness can be much lower if the incentive effect is taken into account. Moreover, this ratio becomes much greater for higher X, because the total benefits of informativeness fall towards zero.
In sum, Figure 1 shows that the total gains from increased informativeness are declining in X. One concern is that when X is high, the moral hazard problem is small to begin with, so it may seem unsurprising that the gains from alleviating the moral hazard problem (by increasing informativeness) are small in absolute terms. Thus, it seems natural that, if the cost κ (θ) of increasing informativeness is fixed in absolute terms, the principal will only pay the cost if the moral hazard problem is large. We thus now compute the gains from improved informativeness as a percentage of the expected wage, i. . These gains are illustrated in Figure 2 , for σ = 1. When the gains are measured in percentage terms, the direction of the difference between the direct and total effects naturally remains unchanged, but the magnitude of the difference becomes much greater for a high X, since expected pay is decreasing in X. When measured in absolute terms, the direct effect was maximized at X = 1; when measured in relative terms, Figure 3 shows that it is maximized for X > 1, because expected pay is decreasing in X. When measured in absolute terms, the total effect was monotonically decreasing in X. When measured in relative terms, there is now an offsetting effect since expected pay is also decreasing in X. However, the second effect is weaker, so the total effect in relative terms continues to decrease in X.
Thus, even if the cost of increasing informativeness κ (θ) were a percentage of the cost of compensation, it remains the case that, when the incentive effect is taken into account, the principal will invest less in informativeness when X is sufficiently high. Thus, workers with high-powered incentives (such as CEOs) should be evaluated more precisely than those with low-powered incentives (such as rank-and-file workers). Note that an analysis focusing on the direct effect and ignoring the incentive effect would reach a different opposite conclusion: if the cost of increasing informativeness were in percentage terms, the principal would invest less in informativeness not only if X is sufficiently high, but also if it is sufficiently low.
Conclusion
This paper studies the principal's benefits from increasing the informativeness of the signal used to evaluate the agent. The direct effect is that higher signal predicion reduces the value of agent's option and thus expected pay. The core focus of the paper is on the indirect effect -how changes in precision affect the agent's incentives. In particular, by taking an optimal contracting approach, we can be specific on how the contract changes in response to increases in informativeness. With general signal distributions, we show that, if effort and informativeness are substitutes, increases in precision weaken the agent's incentives. Thus, the principal must reduce the strike price of the option to preserve effort incentives, increasing the cost of compensation and offsetting the direct effect.
Focusing on signal distributions with a location and scale parameter allows us to derive precise conditions under which substitutes arise. If the initial strike price is high, i.e. if incentives are low-powered to begin with, an increase in informativeness reduces the agent's effort incentives. The intuition is that, if the option is sufficiently out-of-themoney when granted, it will only become in-the-money at maturity if the agent both exerts effort and receives a sufficiently positive shock. When informativeness increases, and noise falls, positive shocks are less likely and so the agent may choose not to work. Thus, the benefits of informativeness are lower due to the negative effect on incentives. The principal therefore optimally invests less in improving informativeness, potentially rationalizing the scarcity of relative performance evaluation in reality. Interestingly, thus result continues to hold when the cost of increasing informativeness is proportional to the cost of compensation and thus the severity of the moral hazard problem.
In contrast, when incentives are high-powered to begin with, an increase in informativeness augments the agent's effort incentives, which provides an additional gain from informativeness over and above the direct effect of reducing volatility traditionally focused upon. Thus, the benefit from filtering out exogenous shocks depends critically on the strength of incentives, and thus the magnitude of the moral hazard problem to begin with.
A Proofs Proof of Lemma 1
We start by arguing that the optimal contract W (s) will be continuous. First, the likelihood ratio is increasing in s for any s, so that the optimal contract is nondecreasing in s for any s, which rules out downward discontinuities in W (s). Second, the constraint that W (s) ≤ 1 rules out upward discontinuities.
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers associated with the three constraints (8), (9), and (10) for a given s by µ, λ(s), and η(s) respectively, the Lagrangian is given by:
Since the optimal contract W (s) is continuous and lim s→−∞ W (s) = 0, 8 we have
It follows that
The first-order necessary condition with respect to W (s) to the constrained opti- 8 Since the likelihood ratio of the normal distribution is increasing, we know that the optimal contract is nondecreasing in π. Therefore, W (π) ≥ lim x→−∞ W (x), for any π. Consider any contract W (π) characterized by lim x→−∞ W (x) = ε > 0. Then define W (π) ≡ W (π) − ε for all π. The contract W (π) does not violate any constraint (in particular, it satisfies the incentive constraint), and it is characterized by a lower agency rent than W (π). This shows that the contract W (π) is not optimal.
mization problem is
We define
If φ(s) > 0 for a given s, then (29) imposes:
Given the non-negativity constraints on the Lagrange multipliers, a necessary condition for this inequality to hold is λ(s) > 0. However, λ(s) > 0 if and only if W (s) = 0. If φ(s) < 0 for a given s, then (29) imposes that
Given the non-negativity constraints on the Lagrange multipliers, this implies that η(s) > 0. Since µ is a constant and the likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing in s, we know from (30) that φ(s) = 0 on a set of probability zero, and that the optimal contract (which is incentive-compatible) exists if there exists a finite and positive X such that
We also know that W (s) = 0 for s < X. We still have to determine the form of the optimal contract for s > X. Given the non-negativity constraints on the Lagrange multipliers discussed above, we know that, for s > X, (10) is binding since η(s) > 0. The optimal contract is therefore characterized by W (s) = 0 ∀ s < X, and W (s) = 1 ∀ s > X.
With this contract, the incentive constraint (4) now becomes (12) . In the proof of Lemma 2 we show that (12) may be rewritten as (35) . The LHS of (35) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of X (by FOSD). Evaluated at X =s, it equals 0 < C.
using the same integration by parts as in the proof of Lemma 2. Since high effort is first-best efficient, the expression in (34) exceeds C. Thus, the intermediate value theorem and the monotonicity of the LHS ensure that a unique solution to (35) exists.
Proof of Lemma 2
We show that the incentive constraint (5) can also be rewritten as
Opening the expressions inside the brackets in equation (4), we obtain:
Applying integration by parts (for e ∈ {0, 1}), gives
Plugging back in the previous expression, we obtain
Canceling terms gives equation (35) .
Proof of Equation (18) We start with the case of bounded support. Adding and subtracting X s sf θ (s|e) ds to (??) yields:
A similar integration by parts as before yields
Substituting back in the previous expression, we can rewrite the agent's expected pay as
Moving to the case of unbounded support, adding and subtracting X s sf θ (s|e) ds to (??) yields:
Applying integration by parts, we have:
Substituting this into the previous equation yields:
Proof of Lemma 3
The agent's expected pay in the case of effort e is given by
Integration by parts yields:
and so (36) can be rewritten:
Sinces and X are not functions of either θ or e, it follows that the agent's expected pay satisfies increasing differences if and only if s X θ F θ (s|e) ds satisfies decreasing differences (and vice-versa). The following Lemma will be useful for this and future proofs:
Lemma 6 For any θ, Since θ parameterizes mean-preserving spreads, the expression on the LHS, E[s|e] is not a function of θ.
From Lemma 6, s X θ F θ (s|e) ds satisfies decreasing differences if and only if X θ s F θ (s|e) ds satisfies increasing differences (since their sum is independent of θ by second-order stochastic dominance). Thus, the agent's expected pay satisfies increasing differences if and only if X θ s F θ (s|e) ds satisfies increasing differences.
Proof of Proposition 1
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (12) gives:
.
By FOSD, the denominator is positive. Lemma 6 yields:
for all X, θ, e. Plugging back:
It is straightforward to show that if X s F θ (q|e) dq satisfies increasing (decreasing) differences and is differentiable with respect to θ, then
for all e H > 0. The denominator is positive by FOSD.
Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 3, the agent's expected pay satisfies increasing differences if and only if π(θ, e) = 
i.e. the single-crossing condition holds. Since s has a location parameter e and scale parameter σ, its cumulative distribution function may be written as F σ (s|e) = G s−e σ , and its probability density function is
. For a given e, an increase in σ is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution, so that it is equivalent to a decrease in θ. Let σ = 1 √ θ , and let X σ be the incentive compatible exercise price.
According to Lemma 2, the agent's expected pay satisfies increasing differences if and only if π X (θ, e) satisfies increasing differences, i.e.:
, where the LHS is the difference between the vegas (sensitivities to σ) of the option-when-working and option-when-shirking.
Using σ = 1 √ θ , we have:
Given that θ > 0, we use the change of variable y H ≡ √ θ(s − e) and y L ≡ √ θs to rewrite this condition as
As e > 0, this is equivalent to
For a distribution symmetric about the mean, this inequality holds if and only if
that is, if and only if X σ ≤ e 2
. The first part of the proof then follows directly from Proposition 1.
To prove equation (21), as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, we have
The LHS of the incentive constraint in (12) is strictly decreasing in X. Given that the equilibrium X satisfies (12) as an equality, we have equation (21) .
Option Vega for Distributions with Location and Scale Parameters
Under the Black-Scholes assumption that the stock price is lognormally distributed, the vega of a stock option is highest when the option is ATM. Claim 1 shows that this result extends to distributions with location and scale parameters.
Claim 1 For distributions parameterized with e and σ such F σ (s|e) = G s−e σ , the option vega is highest for an option such that X σ = e.
Proof. By definition, for given e and X σ ≤s, the vega of the associated option is
where we used (37) to derive the second equality. Using F σ (s|e) = G s−e σ for a distribution with location and scale parameters, we have
Using the change of variable y = 
Given that g(y) > 0, this expression is maximized for X σ = e, i.e., for an ATM option.
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Claim 2 shows that, for symmetric distributions with unbounded support, the vegas of the option-when-working and option-when-shirking are equal for X σ = Proof. We rely on (45) and use the fact that, for a distribution with unbounded support,s = ∞.
, the vega ν e of the option-when-working (e = e) is
yg(y)ds.
For X σ = e 2
, the vega ν 0 of the option-when-shirking (e = 0) is
In addition, yg(y)ds = 0. Equation (48) then implies that ν e = ν 0 . (24) and (25) First, with volatility σ instead of precision θ, the decomposition in (14) 
Proof of Equations
which is strictly negative because of MLRP, which implies FOSD. 
This establishes (24) . < 0 for a given σ, and considering that increasing σ is costless, the given level of σ would not be an equilibrium for any cost of increasing informativeness (including a zero cost).
Using (52), 
Define 
Note that the numerator and the denominator in the fraction of the right-hand-side of (60) are y N (x σ ) and y D (x σ ), respectively. We have shown above that y N (x σ ) > y D (x σ ) for any x σ > 0. For any two given b and a such that b > a ≥ 0, we therefore have
Rearranging (61) yields
for any b > , given that y N (x σ ) > 0 for x σ ≥ 1 2σ
. Setting a = 
Given that X σ −ē < s, this condition does not hold for any X σ , which completes the proof.
C At-The-Money Options
This Appendix shows that the model's main results continue to hold when the principal is restricted to granting ATM options. We consider the same problem described in Section 3.1, except that we assume that the contract takes the form of ATM options. Considering ATM options requires that we complement the model by deriving the t = 0 stock price. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the firm has a single share outstanding. Denoting the stock price at time 0 by S 0 , we have S 0 = E[q] given the assumptions of a zero discount rate and risk neutrality. In addition, with a symmetric distribution with location parameter e, we have S 0 = e.
Since the strike price is fixed (at the stock price), the number n ≤ 1 of ATM options granted adjusts to satisfy the incentive constraint. 10 It follows that e =ē in equilibrium, and S 0 =ē. With ATM options, the exercise price is therefore X =ē. Considering the same distributions as in section 3.2, we have the following results:
Lemma 7 (Effect of volatility on number of options) With ATM options, dn dσ < 0.
Proof. Totally differentiating the LHS of the incentive constraint in (4) With ATM options, the total change in expected pay that follows a change in informativeness is of a lesser magnitude than the partial change holding all else constant: while an improvement in informativeness lowers the value of the agent's options, ceteris paribus, it also requires that the agent receives more options for incentive compatibility. This incentive effect partially offsets the benefits to the principal.
